Can History Be Objective? (Part 4)

By Ron Nash

Those who believe that the unavoidable presence of value judgments in the historian’s work necessarily implies hard relativism ignore the important difference between psychology and logic. It is one thing to study the psychological process by which a historian formulates his beliefs and another thing to study the logical process by which those beliefs can be justified. In his actual work, the historian may be influenced by a number of cultural and psychological factors as well as personal quirks and prejudices. But however his conclusions are reached, that work can always be evaluated by criteria that make the presence of the valuation element much less significant than hard relativists have thought. It is important not to confuse the processes of discovery and justification. The process of discovering the past may be influenced by any number of psychological and societal factors.

But when the historian turns to the matter of justifying his interpretations, his psychological quirks and prejudices, his back ground, and his interests should become irrelevant. Implicit in the analysis of Beard’s fourth argument is my earlier distinction between two senses of historical objectivity. I am admitting that the actual work of the historian in selecting and organizing his data and then describing the past may be inescapably tied to that historians own values. But that historian’s work can always be challenged; and when it is, his evidence, reasoning, and interpretations will be subject to critical revision.

Not only is hard relativism difficult to support, it is also a position vulnerable to several serious objections. For one thing, hard relativism entails the belief that there is no difference between good history and bad history, an absurd conclusion to be sure. If hard relativism were true, any distinction between truth and error in history would disappear, historical knowledge would become impossible, and it is difficult to see how history could merit any respect as a cognitive-discipline.

As long as there is a difference between history and propaganda and between good history and bad history, some historical writing much be capable in principle of rising above the personal biases of the historian. While some perspectivism and distortion may be unavoidable, what the historian produces from his perspective is open to criticism and revision.

Second, hard relativism entails historical skepticism. Since the various points of view taken by historians are, according to relativist, subjective, there is no possible way to settle disputes among historians. Between the different historians and the past, there is an insurmountable wall that makes any knowledge of the past impossible.

Third, hard relativism is inconsistent with assumptions that are inseparable from any scholarly enterprise. Norman Geisler writes:

“Why strive for accuracy unless it is believed that the revision is more objectively true than the previous view? Why critically analyze unless improvement toward a more accurate view is the assumed goal? Perfect objectivity may be practically unattainable within the limited resources of the historian on most if not all topics. But be this as it may, the inability to attain 100 percent objectivity is a long way from total relativity. Reaching a degree of objectivity which is subject to criticism and revision is a more realistic conclusion than the relativist’s arguments. In short, there is no reason to eliminate the possibility of a sufficient degree of historical objectivity.”

Yale professor Nils Alstrup Dahl relates these conclusions to historical research about Jesus;

“The fact that objectively assured results can only be reached in an approximate way does not in itself distinguish Jesus-research from other historical science. The point is rather that the difficulties with which all historical science must grapple are especially perceptible in this area. All historical work is influenced by the presuppositions of the historian, and he himself is a child of his own time. That becomes particularly noticeable when Jesus is made the object of historical research, and even the historian obviously cannot deal with Jesus without being involved in a positive or negative way. It is a real question whether personal involvement is not a positive presupposition for a scholar’s attaining to any kind of historically fruitful results. To a certain degree, wishful thinking and subjective errors can be eliminated by methodically scientific work, when the will to truth is present. Scholars with different starting points co-operate and are able to mutually to correct each other.”

Dahl has a point. Is the historian with a strongly negative bias toward the person and teaching of Jesus .. really in a stronger position to discover the truth than someone who approaches his subject matter with a degree of interest and sympathy? .. bias can be a two-edged sword .. everyone who attempts to learn the historical truth about the life and teaching of Jesus, about his death and resurrection and about how convictions about that death and resurrection gave birth to the Christian church will be biased to some extent.

Certainly a bias that unconsciously leads a historian to say that regardless of the evidence, he knows before the fact that certain kinds of things could not have happened is not a bias conducive to an open-minded historical investigation. Unbelieving historians need to give greater attention to their commitment to a naturalistic worldview; they need to reexamine the extent to which their naturalistic presuppositions control the way they handle their data. Perhaps the historian whose world view is open to the possibility of the miraculous holds a position that is more deserving of the term scientific.

Christianity has an obvious stake in the debate over historical objectivity. … both Christian and secular historians are stuck with options somewhere between hard objectivism and hard relativism.

Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4