Can History Be Objective? (Part 2)

By Ron Nash

The distinction I have drawn between the two meanings of historical objectivity makes it easier to see the four possible positions on this subject are available. Historical relativism comes in two forms: hard and soft relativism. Historical objectivism also assumes two forms: hard and soft objectivism.

What we call hard relativism in history is the view that the subjectivity of the historian is so radical and so inescapable that the discovery of any truth about the past is impossible. According to this view, no historian can ever free himself from his own subjectivity (his perspective, his values, his biases, etc) sufficiently to discover the truth about the past. Therefore, knowledge about the past is impossible. Hard relativism, then, necessarily involves historical skepticism. According to this view, history is so completely subjective, relative and arbitrary.

Hard objectivism is my name for the position that it is possible for the historian to free himself from subjective judgments and interpretations and reach the point where he simply reports the facts. According to the hard objectivist, all subjectivity can in principle be eliminated from history, a fact that, if true, would make history a value-free inquiry.

Both hard relativism and hard objectivism approach the question of historical objectivity in the second sense noted earlier. A hard objectivist holds that the historian can achieve independence from his interests and values and write a value-free history. Thus for him, history can be objective. A hard relativist maintains that the ideal of a value-free history is impossible, and this implies both that history cannot be objective and that historical knowledge is impossible. As we will see shortly, serious difficulties afflict both hard objectivism and hard relativism.

According to a soft relativistic view, even though historical writing may evidence the presence of the historians subjectivity, history can still avoid being arbitrary by remaining open to evaluation by objective canons of evidence and truth. The work of every historian will reflect more or less the interests, values, and world view of the writer. Some perspectivism and distortion may be unavoidable. Nonetheless, what the historian produces from his perspective is open to criticism and revision. Thus while any historical account will be relative to some degree, it is capable of being objective in the sense that it is correctable; it is subject to revision and thus is not arbitrary.

As I use the term, soft objectivism does not differ from soft relativism in any significant way. The major difference between the two is the direction from which one arrives at the position. My point can be clarified by means of two schema. The first builds on my earlier distinction between four possible positions on the subject of historical objectivity:

Hard Relativism: History is subjective (value-laden) and arbitrary

Soft Relativism: History is subjective but need not be arbitrary.

Hard Objectivism: History can rise above the historian’s subjectivity and be value-free.

Soft Objectivism: History can never be completely free from the values of the historian; but this does not mean that history is arbitrary since it is open to critical revision.

In considering the viability of these options, it hardly seems necessary to waste any time critiquing hard objectivism. Why beat a dead horse when it has been dead for several generations? Whatever the value of their own theories may have been, idealists like Dilthey, Croce, and Collingwood unveiled the folly of any quest for history as it really was. The nineteenth-century model of a scientific history was an oversimplified distortion of the historian’s enterprise.

However, hard relativism is still regarded as a viable option in some circles. A careful evaluation of the position and the arguments offered in its support seems necessary.

One of the better-known cases for hard relativism is found in Charles A. Beard’s essay, “That Noble Dream.” According to Beard, “the historian’s powers are limited, He may search for, but he cannot find the ‘objective truth’ of history or write it ‘as it actually was.’” Beard’s case in support of historical relativism can be reduced to four major arguments. For one thing, the historian can never know his subject matter directly. All knowledge of the past is indirect and inferential. Thus, the historian cannot begin with the past; he must start with that which is present to him (his sources) and work his way back into the past.

Second, Beard argued that the historian’s knowledge of his subject matter is necessarily incomplete. The historian is forced by the sheer mass of evidence to select his facts. But this presupposes a criterion of selection that varies from one historian to another.

Third, Beard pointed out that historians do not simply accept passively what their sources tell them. They must approach their sources critically, much the way a lawyer cross-examines his witnesses. If historical inquiry is to be productive, it must have a direction from its inception. But as Beard saw it, any admission that historical inquiry is goal-directed implies that it is prejudiced from the start.

Finally, the hard relativists insist, historical investigation is value-charged. History is not discovered so much as it is constructed, a process inseparable from the historian’s own subjective concerns, interests and prejudices. We will now examine each of Beard’s four major arguments.

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