Can History Be Objective? (Part 1)

By Ron Nash

To what extent can the historian attain objectivity? This question is one of the most important and at the same time on e of the most puzzling subjects discussed in the philosophy of history. The debate over whether the historian can achieve impartial and objective knowledge about the past has obvious relevance for Christianity. Regardless of the position taken on the question, some impact on Christian belief will be felt.

Suppose one adopts a radically relativist position toward history. Radical relativism is the view that impartial and objective historical knowledge about anything in the past is impossible. Since Christianity is a historical religion in the sense that the historicity of certain events like the crucifixion and the resurrection area a necessary condition for its truth, the skepticism about the past that must result from a total historical relativism would seriously weaken one of Christianity’s major apologetic foundations. A thinking person can hardly embrace a radical historical relativism with any feeling of joy. If historical relativism should prove to be true, no knowledge about any event in the past would be possible.

But if an acceptance of a radical historical relativism would present us with problems, we will not get much relief by turning to a radical historical objectivism. The difficulties created by this second option are visible in the nineteenth-century debate over the nature of historical understanding. Inspired by Ranke’s search for the past as it really was, many scholars assumed that an objective knowledge of the past was not only possible but mandatory. Anything less than a complete and impartial account of some event or series of events in the past was bad history.

But once this assumption was made and people considered that the New Testament Gospels were partisan interpretations of the life and teaching of Jesus, the historical veracity of those writings was called into question. If a complete objective history is the only acceptable norm, then the search for the historical foundations of Christianity is in trouble from the very start.

The problem of historical objectivity may seem more difficult than it really is because people are inattentive to a crucial distinction between two senses in which history may be said to be objective. Depending on which sense of the word objective is used, the question about history’s objectivity may correctly be answered by both yes and no. The proposition “History is objective” may mean either, 1 – the historian’s reconstruction of the past is always open to criticism and revision or 2 – the historian’s reconstruction of the past may be value-free.

Corresponding to these two views, the claim “History is not objective” may mean either, 1 – the historian’s work is arbitrary of 2 – the historian’s work is subjective. Much of the confusion that characterizes writings about historical objectivity results from a failure to keep these two sets of issues distinct. As we start toward presenting my own position, I affirm the view that history can be objective in the sense of being open to critical revision. Is history open to constant criticism and revision? It had better be! If it is not, historical writing would be arbitrary, subject to every whim and caprice of the author. Understood in the first sense, historical objectivity is a necessary and desirable goal. Is history value-free? As I shall argue shortly, no. But I hasten to add that this admission by itself does not imply any radical kind of historical relativism.

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